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During the 193Os, a number of distinguished  economists 
attempted  to inject the concept of monopoly  power  into the 






were by Chamberlain  (1934), Robinson  (1934), Lerner 
Kaldor  (1934,1935), and Kalecki  (1938).  In response 
intellectual  assault, conservative  microeconomists 
refused to revise their competitive  models  to 
the changing nature of the average corporation. 
Their  single concession  was to include the classic monopoly 
model  in most textbooks,  but only then with the excessively 
restrictive  condition  that prohibits  all substitutes.  In 
this form, the model  is so qualified  that it is only 
marginally  relevant to the vast majority  of actual 
enterprises. 
But the early theorists were pioneering  a more general 
role for monopoly  power  in the theory of the firm.  The idea 
was evolving that all firms have varying  degrees  of monopoly 
power which  in turn determine  economic behavior.  The role 
of monopoly  power  in the real economy  is probably  even more 
pervasive  today than it was in the 193Os, but the content  of 
microeconomic  theory  shows little evidence  of adapting  to 
this growing  reality.  Perhaps out of frustration,  many  of 
these early scholars  literally abandoned  the microeconomic 2 
implications  of their ideas and instead directed  their work 
towards the more enlightened  and still evolving  fields of 
macroeconomics  and industrial organization. 
The purpose  of this paper is to outline a consistent 
microeconomic  theory of the firm based on the concept  of 
monopoly  power.  It builds on the heritage  of Post Keynesian 
authors, Robinson,  Kaldor, and Kalecki, but literally 
extends the theory  in several directions.  First, monopoly 
power  is defined  formally in terms of substitution.  In this 
way, monopoly  power  is recognized  as a fundamental 
charcteristic  of 
of its behavior. 
between monopoly 
profits,  and the 
systematically. 
a firm which  in turn affects  other aspects 
Also  in this theory, the relationships 
power, demand elasticities,  markups,  total 
distribution  of profits,  are traced 
Before turning  to the theory  it is important to point 
out that I have benefited  as much  from the mistakes  of my 
predecessors  as from their genuine  insights.  Kriesler 
(19871, for example, noted that Kalecki created  considerable 
confusion  by failing to clearly distinguish  between  the 
degree of monopoly  and the markup.  This problem  is resolved 
here by defining monopoly  power  in terms of substitution  and 
identifying  it as one of several determinants  of the markup. 
It is always easier to recognize  a problem  like this one and 
propose  a solution when someone else has stumbled  across  it 
first. 3 
Substitution 
A fundamental proposition  in this theory  is that all 
firms face the threat of substitution  from other producers 
but in varying  degrees.  The sum of these substitution 
possibilities  indicate the level of monopoly  power;  firms 
with  few close substitutes  exercise  far more monopoly  power 
than those with many.  But how does one measure  the degree 
\ 
of substitution  between two commoditities? 
The traditional  measure  is the cross price  elasticity 
(CPE) which measures  how the output of one firm or industry 
responds  to the price change of another.  If two goods are 
close substitutes,  a small change in the price of one is 
expected  to cause a large increase in the consumption  of 
another.  This  is calculated  by dividing  the percentage 
change  in the consumption  of product y by the percentage 
change  in the price of x.  By definition  the cross-price 
elasticity  is, 
CPE = 
There  is, 
may be an 
Percentaqe  change  in consumtion  of v = a,% 
Percentage  change  in price of x  dPx  Y 
however,  a deficiency  in this measure  because  y 
excellent  substitute  for x even though the CPE is 
very  small.  The problem  is that when the supply of y 
relatively  fixed, the price of y will simply  increase 
without  greatly  changing  the consumption  of y. 
is This shortcoming  suggests that a better measure  would 
be based  on revenue because  it includes both output and 
price responses.  When the price of x increases,  consumers 
reduce their total expenditure  on that product  and 
reallocate  their savings among a variety  of goods or 
services.1  By measuring  these flows, we are essentially 
measuring  the degree of substitution.  The index that 
incorporates  these principles  is the cross revenue  \ 
elasticity  (CRE).  The denominator  is still the percentage 
change  in the price of x but the numerator  is now the 
percentage  change in revenue of y  (Ry).  This can be written 
as, 
CRE = Percentage  chanse  in revenue of Y = dR 
Percentage  change  in price of x  ti 
.Plr 
Px Ry 
A large value  for CRE implies that y is a good 
substitute  for x because  a small price  increase will  induce 
a relatively  large transfer  of revenue  from x to y.2  But 
even CRE is not entirely  satisfactory  since we would  like 
our measure  of substitution  to correctly  rank the products 
that stand the most to gain from a price  increase  in x.  The 
1  The exception  is when the price elasticity  for x is less 
than one which  is quite improbable  for the output of a 
single firm.  This case is therefore  excluded  in the 
following  analysis. 
2 When CRE is zero, y is unrelated  to x because  both  its 
price and output are unaffected  by changes  in the price of 
X.  When y is a complement  for x, CRE will be negative. reason CRE fails to do this is because  it measures  the 
percentage  change  in revenue relative to the revenue  of each 
substitute.  For substitutes with small initial revenue,  the 
CRE may greatly  exaggerate  its relative  importance. 
The Substitution  Index 
This problem  is corrected  in a related 
substitution  index  (SI), which measures  the 
measure,  the 
percentage'. 
change  in y's revenue relative to x's initial revenue.  The 
substitution  index is defined as,3 
SI,y =  Chanse  in revenue of y 
Total revenue of x  = 
Percentage  change  in price of x 
dR .Px 
a-9  XK;; 
The substitution  index is a far better measure  of 
substitutability  because  it includes both output and price 
responses  without  being unduly  influenced by the initial 
revenue  of y.  A high substitution  index between  x and y 
implies that a price  increase in x will cause consumers  to 
transfer  significant  amounts of expenditures  from x to y. 
It is also important to point out that the substitution 
index is not symmetric  and that SIxy does not have to equal 
SIyx.  Although  the two values  are likely to be related, 
they are not necessarily  identical.  It is therefore 
3 The substitution  index  (SI) is related to the cross 
revenue  elasticity  as indicated by the following equation, 
SIxy = CRExy(Ry/R,)  - important to specify the variable with the price change as 
the first subscript. 
Monopoly  Power and Substitution 
It was mentioned  previously  that monopoly  power depends 
on the availability  of substitutes,  or more precisely,  on 
the number  and strength of those substitutes.  The  \ 
definition  of monopoly  power  (M) can now be stated more 
formally as a function of the sum of substitution  indices 
(SIxi) for all n other products  related to x.  This can be 
stated as, 
1+  c s1xi 
i=l 
According  to this definition,  when there are many good 
substitutes,  the sum of SI's in the denominator  will be 
large, and monopoly  power will be close to zero.  As 
substitutes  decrease  in number or strength,  the sum 
decreases  and monopoly  power rises.  If there were no 
substitutes  whatsoever  then monopoly  power would take  its 
maximum value  of one. 
A firm can increase  its monopoly  power by decreasing 
the number or strength of its substitutes  and the most 
direct way to accomplish  this is to buy one or more 7 
competitors.  In this way, the revenue that once dissipated 
to competitors  can be reduced by also raising the price  of 
the substitute  acquired by the firm.  The five major  car 
divisions  of General Motors  serve as a useful  example  of 
this principle.  If Chevrolet were an independent  car 
company,  an increase  in its price would cause sales to 
spillover  to all other substitutes  including other divisions 
of GM, such as Pontiac,  Buick, Oldsmobile,  and Cadillac,. 
But as part of GM, a general price  increase by Chevrolet  and 
other GM divisions  results  in a much smaller  spillover. 
There  is no question here that Chevrolet  exercises  more 
monopoly  power as part of GM than as an independent  auto 
manufacturer. 
Price Elasticity  of Demand 
Now that monopoly  power  is defined,  the next step is to 
show how  it is related to demand,  in particular,  the price 
elasticity  of demand  (PE).  This elasticity  measures  the 
responsiveness  of the quantity demanded  to price changes  and 
is defined  as, 
PE =  Percentaqe  chanse  in q 
Percentage  change 
uantitv demanded  of x/ =  I%;31 
in price of x 
Values  of PE, greater than one are referred to as elastic 
and indicate a relatively  large change in quantity  for a given change  in price.  The opposite case, when PE is less 
than or equal to one doesn't apply to the case of a single 
firm.4  All  firms prefer to have a low elasticity  because 
this implies that a price  increase will cause a relatively 
small decrease  in revenue. 
The relationship  between monopoly  power and elasticity 
is derived  in Appendix  A but the results can easily be 
summarized:  for any firm, monopoly  power  is inversely  \ 
related to its elasticity  of demand.  This simple 
relationship  is written  as: 
(1)  M=  1 
PE 
High levels of monopoly  power are associated  with  low price 
elasticities. 
Markup  and Profits 
The final step is to show that monopoly  power  is 
related to the markup  (m), defined  as the relative 
difference  between price  (P) and marginal  costs  (mc), often 
referred to as the Lerner Index.5 
4 If the elasticity  was less than or equal to one then a 
firm could  increase  its price and revenue would  stay the 
same or increase.  This is extremely unlikely  in the price 
range relevant  for most  firms. 
5 Marginal  cost is equal to the additional  cost of producing 
one more unit. (2)  m  =  P-mc 
P 
The markup  is equal to the profit on the last unit of 
production  relative to the price.  While a firm is free to 
set any markup  it chooses, there is always one that 
maximizes  current profits.  Determining  this markup  (m*) is 
quite simple because  it is exactly equal to monopoly  power 
(M)  l  This  fact is also derived  in Appendix  A and can be 
written  as, 
(3)  m* = M = l/PE 
Remember  that monopoly  power ranges from zero to one which 
means that the optimum markup has the same range.  This 
establishes  the first important result; the particular 
markup which maximizes  current profits  is exactly  equal to 
the value  of monopoly  power. 
A producer  is always  free to select a markup  different 
from m* but then profits would be less than the maximum  II*. 
This point  is illustrated  in Figure 1.  For values  of m less 
than or greater  than m*, profits  fall short of their 
potential.  There are occaisions when  firms intentionally 
select a markup different  from m  * such as during periods  of 
increasing  or decreasing  demand or when  firms choose to 
forgo current profits with the hope of increasing  their 
monopoly  power through price competition.  If price 
competition  becomes particularly  severe, markups  and profits 10 
could  fall well below  their optimum values  and even become 
negative.  But barring  either of these conditions,  it is 
reasonable  to expect  firms to generally  maximize  current 
profits  and set markups  at the optimum point, m*. 
Figure 1 
The  Relationship  Between 
Markups  and  Profits 
Profits  (7~) 
> 
Markup 
Choosina  the Correct  Demand Elasticity 
The key variable  in determining  both monopoly  power  and 
the profit maximizing  markup  is the price  elasticity  of 
demand.  If each  firm had a single price  elasticity  then  it 
would  be a simple matter  to calculate  the other variables. 11 
But in reality, there  is usually more than one price 
elasticity.  Economists  have long been aware that price 
elasticity  may depend on the level of output.  In fact, only 
under  rather special circumstances  would one expect the 
price elasticity  to be entirely  independent  of output.  This 
raises an interesting  question,  if the elasticity  is 
variable,  how does this affect the definition  of monopoly 
power and the profit maximizing  markup?  \ 
Athough  a variable  price elasticity  increases the 
complexity  of the model,  it doesn't  alter the basic 
relationships.  It does mean that instead of monopoly  power 
determining  the optimum markup  (m*), the two are jointly 
determined.  This is illustrated  in Figure 2 where the 
inverse of the price  elasticity  (PE) is drawn as a positive 
function of output.6  The markup  is also related to output 
since the firm sells more at lower markups  than it does at 
higher  ones. 
One of the conditions  for profit maximization  specified 
in Equation  3 is that the markup  (m) must equal the inverse 
of the price elasticity  (PE).  This occurs at output x* in 
Figure 2, where the two curves  intersect.  This point 
6 This  implies that PE is inversely related to output. 
Although  this  is true for most demand curves,  including 
linear ones, an exception may occur if consumers  have a 
strong preference  for some minimum  quantity  of the good. 
This is not, however,  especially  likely. 12 
Figure  2 
The  Case  of Variable  Price  Elasticity  (PE) 
Markup  (m) 
m*  =  M 
X*  output (x) 
determines  both the profit maximizing  markup  (m*) and the 
level of monopoly  power  (M). 
In the previous  discussion,  the price  elasticity  of 
demand  was assumed  to be constant which  determines  a single 
value  for monopoly  power and the optimum markup.  This case 
would  be represented  in Figure 2 by a horizontal  line for 
l/PE.  In either  case, whether  l/PE is horizontal  or upward 
sloping,  the profit maximizing  markup  is determined  by the 
intersection  of the two curves. 
A more  complex problem  is presented  by the fact that 
the elasticity  of demand tends to change  over time.  The 13 
more time one allows after a price change, the easier  it 
becomes  for new firms to enter the market  or for consumers 
to make  substitutions.  Therefore  demand can be expected  to 
be more elastic  in the long-run than the short-run.  Once 
again there  is the question  of which elasticity  to choose  in 
calculating  monopoly  power and the profit maximizing  markup. 
If the firm is concerned with maximizing  the present 
value  of current and future profits,  neither  elasticity'is 
entirely  appropriate.  The short-run elasticity  (PE) can be 
used to calculate  a markup that maximizes  short-run  profits 
but ignores the effect of current decisions  on future 
profits.  Similarly,  a lower markup based on the long-run 
elasticity  will maximize  future profits  at the expense  of 
current profits.  There  is, however,  an adjusted price 
elasticity which  determines  a markup that maximizes  the 
present value  of all profits  and it is likely to lie 
somewhere between  the short-run and long-run elasticities. 
It is essentially  found by increasing the short-run 
elasticity  to account  for the effect of changes  in current 
output on future prices.  A more detailed mathematical 
description  of the adjusted price elasticity  is contained  in 
Appendix  C.  If changes  in current output have no effect on 
future demand  or the discount  rate is very high, the 
adjusted  and short-run price elasticities  will be equal. 14 
The Distribution  of Mononolv  Profits 
Monopoly  power may be a great source of profits  but 
there  is no guarantee  that they will be entirely  captured  by 
the firm.  As soon as it becomes known that a firm is 
extremely  successful,  claims on its surplus are likely to 
arise  from diverse  sectors.  Among the most visible 
claimants  are unions which typically  adjust their demands 
for higher wages and benefits  in accordance  with  firm 
profitability.  To the extent that they are successful, 
unions  stand to capture a share of the profits  arising  from 
monopoly  power.  Foreign producers  may also be induced to 
increase their exports to those markets where profits  are 
particularly  high.  And under certain conditions,  these 
producers  may also capture a share of profits.  Monopoly 
power only creates the profits,  it doesn't necessarily 
determine  how they are allocated. 
The model  of monopoly  surplus developed  in this section 
shows how profits  can be distributed  among  firms, unions, 
and imports.  Although  the recipients  of monopoly  profits 
are not limited to these three sectors,  in most cases they 
probably  account  for the largest shares.  The possibility  of 
extending  the model to other sectors is discussed  later. 
The starting point  for the theory of monopoly  surplus 
is the labor demand curve which shows the amount of labor a 
firm would employ at various wage levels.1  The shape of 
1 Wages  are used  in this context as total hourly 
compensation  which  includes benefits. 15 
this curve, presented  in Figure  3, shows that  firms will 
hire more workers  as the wage rate declines.  The rationale 
behind  this is that  firms won't pay any more  for a unit  of 
labor than  it contributes  in additional  revenue.  And each 
additional  worker  contributes  less in revenue,  not because 
the worker  is necessarily  less productive,  but because 
additional  units of output must be sold at lower prices.2 
Consequently  the firm hires additional  workers  only at lower 
wage  rates. 
Figure  3 
The  Definition  of Monopoly  Surplus 
Wage 
f 




Panel  B 
2 It is assumed that all factors are variable  which makes 
figure 6.1 a long-run  demand curve  for labor.  It also means 
that diminshing  returns  are less relevant. 16 
There  is another way to explain the labor demand  curve 
which  is more relevant  for the theory of monopoly  surplus. 
The demand curve  in Figure 3 represents  the the maximum  wage 
that a firm is willing  to pay for each unit of labor.  For 
example,  the most the firm would be willing  to pay for a 
worker  at Ll is a wage of Wl.  As long as the firm pays Wl 
or less, it will make a positive profit on this particular 
worker.  If the current wage  is Wg then the profit per\ 
worker  is indicated by the vertical  distance between  the 
labor demand curve and the current wage Wg.  The firm 
effectively  breaks  even on its last worker when employment 
reaches,  Lg.  Also, the wage Wm in the figure indicates  the 
profits  on the first unit of labor  (Wm-Wo) as well as the 
maximum  wage which would cause the firm to cease production. 
Because of the nature of the labor demand curve, the 
profits made on each unit of labor are cumulative.  The fact 
that the last worker  is barely profitable  does not detract 
from the much greater profits generated  by previous  ones. 
Therefore  the total profits  of the firm is equal to the area 
bounded  by the labor demand curve and the current wage, 
designated  by the shaded area in panel b of Figure  3.  This 
area, defined  as monopoly  surplus  (S), is equal to the 
firm's maximum  profits  (II*). For any profit maximizing 
producer,  monopoly  surplus and profits  are equivalent. 
This result  is also derived  in appendix  B and can be written 
as, l-r*  = s*. 17 
Unions  and Monooolv  Surplus 
This model  is particularly  useful  for illustrating  the 
effect  of unions  on profits.  When  successful,  unions  can 
force a firm to pay a higher wage, W,, as illustrated  in 
Figure  4.  The monopoly  surplus  from the previous  example  is 
now divided  into three parts.  The upper  area  is equivalent 
to the firm's monopoly  surplus  (Sf) which  is again bounded 
by the labor demand  curve and the union wage  rate.  The 
firm's surplus  and profits  shrink  in direct  proportion  to 
the increase  in the union wage. 
Figure  4 
The  Distribution  of Monopoloy  Surplus: 
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As one would  expect, the union gain  (Su) is equal to 
the total additional  income accruing to union workers.  It 
is represented  by the rectangle  in Figure 4 directly  below 
the firm's profits  and can be calculated  by multiplying  the 
length of one side, the union wage  increment  (W,-WO), by the 
other, union employment  (Lu).  In general,  the magnitude  of 
the union gain is determined  by the size of the union wage 
increment  and the shape of the labor demand curve.  \ 
Area a in the figure represents  a net loss resulting 
from reduced employment  under higher union wages.  The wage 
increase causes the firm to cut production,  raise prices, 
and reduce employment  in order to maximize  its own share of 
profits.  The sum of all the components  associated  with the 
firm, the union, and the net loss are equivalent  to the 
surplus that would have been available  in a nonunion  setting 
(S*)  - 
Imnorts and Mononolv  Surplus 
Unrestricted  imports can potentially  ignite a round of 
cutthroat  competition  between domestic  and foreign producers 
which, would eliminate  the surplus altogether.  However, 
even with substantial  imports, price competition  can often 
be avoided  if foreign firms face explicit or implicit 
quotas,  or some other trade restriction.  Rather than 
eliminating  the surplus,  foreign producers  in this situation 
are more likely to capture a share of it. 19 
To demonstrate  this, it is assumed that foreign 
producers,  under an import quota, capture a predetermined 
quantity  of a firm's sales.  This has the effect of shifting 
the demand curve for the domestic  firm to the left by this 
set amount.  The decrease  in product demand  is followed by a 
decrease  in the firm's demand  for labor since the two are so 
closely  related. 
Figure 5 shows the effect of imports on the  \ 
distribution  of monopoly  surplus.  First it should be noted 
that employment  drops from the union case  (Lu) to a lower 
level associated  with both unions and imports  (Li).  Even 
assuming  that wages remain the same, unions  lose part of 
their surplus  (S,) because  of employment  losses.3  The 
firm's surplus  (Sf) also declines because  imports have the 
effect of uniformly  decreasing  the amount of profit  that  it 
makes on each unit of labor.  The loss to both unions  and 
the firm is represented  by area b in the figure. 
The surplus associated with  imports  (Si) represents  the 
firm's loss but does not necessarily  equal the gains made by 
foreign  firms.  To calculate  this would require more 
information  about their costs and prices than is apparent 
from this simple figure.  Nevertheless,  we would  expect 
3 Under  such conditions  it is not inconceivable  that the 
union wage would eventually  fall, causing a redistribution 
in the remaining  surplus between  firms and unions. 20 
Figure 5 
The  Distribution  of Monopoly  Surplus: 
Firms,  Unions  and  Imports 
Wage 
wm 
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l  Labor 
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foreign producers  to be better  off when they are challenging 
domestic  firms which  have significant  monopoly  power  and 
persist  in maximizing  short run profits.  In this  situation, 
foreign  firms have the potential  to make considerable 
profits. 
The Distribution  Equation 
From Figure  5 it is clear that both unions  and imports 
can reduce the surplus and consequently  the monopoly profits 
actually captured by a firm.  It is also evident  from the 21 
figure that the sum of all the various  components  should 
equal the original  surplus  (S*).  To simplify matters,  it is 
convenient  to combine the union surplus with  its net loss 
(a) and imports with 
monopoly  profits  can 
equation. 
(4)  n* = s* = Sf + 
its loss  (b).  The distribution  of 
now be condensed  into the following 
(s,+a)  +  (Si+b) 
According  to this equation,  the monopoly  profits  of a 
firm are distributed  among firms, unions,  imports, and net 
losses.  It  is often necessary  to refer to the fraction or 
share of profits  (s) captured by each sector.  This can be 
defined  as the surplus associated with each sector divided 
by the original  surplus or profits. 
(5)  Firm's Share:  sf = SF/s* 
Union  Share:  %I  =  (S,+a)/S* 
Import Share:  si =  (Si+b)/S* 
And  finally, the share of any one sector can be calculated 
in terms of the other by the following distribution 
identity. 
(6)  1  E  Sf  +  Su  +  Si 
This  identity  is a useful tool for showing the relationship 
between  each sector's  share of monopoly profits.  If the 
share of any one sector increases then one or more of the 22 
other shares must decrease.  For example,  an increase  in the 
import share, must come at the expense of either the union 
or firm's share or some combination  of the two.  It is 
impossible  for any sector to gain without  causing comparable 
reductions  for other sectors. 
In reality, the beneficiaries  of monopoly  power do not 
have to be limited to firms, unions, and imports.  These 
particular  ones are useful  for illustrating  the theory\and 
in many cases, may actually  represent the most  important 
sectors.  However,  in some cases, managers  and other 
nonproduction  workers may also claim a significant  share 
through  inflated salaries, benefits,  bonuses,  or 
perquisites.  The government  may also tap into the surplus 
as a source of financing  for the public  sector. 
Summary 
This completes  the theory of monopoly  power  from 
substitution  to distribution.  Implicit  in this presentation 
are the assumptions  that demand  is stable and that firms 
generally  eschew price competition.  While these conditions 
are necessary  to establish  the basic definitions  and 
relationships,  they can easily be relaxed to analyze more 
general  situations. 
It turns out that the concept of monopoly  power  is in 
fact essential  for exploring  these more realistic 
conditions.  For example, the probability  that any firm will 
choose to practice  price competition  should be related  to 23 
its monopoly  power.  Similarly,  the possibility  that a firm 
will cut its price during periods  of slack demand  should 
also depend,  among other factors, on monopoly  power. 
Consequently,  the concept of monopoly  power provides  a 
promising  tool for exploring  other important  economic 
topics. 24 
Appendix A 
The specific  relationships  between  substitution, 
monopoly  power, price elasticity,  and markups  are derived  in 
this appendix.  The following definitions  are written  in 
terms of prices  (P), revenue-(R),  and marginal 
for two distinct  commodities  (x and y). 
The Price Elasticity  (ex): 
ex  = I  I 
dX,p, 
dP,-X 
The Cross Revenue  Elasticity  (rxy): 
'XY = dR  P, 
c3Fy  X.5 
The Revenue  Elasticity  (TX): 
TX  = dR,,P, 
GR, 
The Substitution  Index  (SIxy): 
SIxy  =  (rxy)  R 
g  = E$gf 
In the first step, it is assumed that the 
by x when  it increases  its price  is completely 
other commodities.1  Or, 
(1)  dF$+  _c”  dI&,  =  0 
PX  1=1  X 
Multiplying  both sides of  (1) by P,/R, we 
result that, 
(2)  dF&P+  +  .c”  da  P,  = 0 
x  x  1=1  x*'R;; 
costs  (mc), 
revenue  lost 
captured  by n 
have the 
11 It is assumed that some fraction of the revenue 
will be saved.  Therefore  one of the i commodities 
represent  savings. 
lost by x 
must 25 
And based on the definitions,  this can be simplified  to, 
(3)  rx  = -E,  =xY 
This states that the revenue elasticity  of x, is equal to 
the negative  of the sum of the substitution  indices.  It is 
assumed that rx ranges from zero to negative  infinity. 
Using the definition  of monopoly  power  (M) in the text, we 
have, 
(4)  M =  1 
1 - rx 
If we expand rx we find the following result. 
(5)  TX  =  dR.P,  = 
dPx R, 
Finally,  substituting 
(6)  M=  J__ 
eX 
In order to show the relationship  between monopoly 
power and the markup, we must assume that firms maximize 
profits.  We can then use the pricing  rule for a monopolist 
which  states that marginal  cost is a function of the price 
and price elasticity. 
d(P  X),1  =  (X  +  P, dX  ) 1 = 1 - e, 
V?-X  dP,  X 
(5) into  (4) we have the result: 
(7)  mc =  (1 - l/e,)P, 
This can be rearranged  to show that,2 
(8)  1  =  P, - mc = Markup 
eX  PX 
Combining  (8) and  (6) we have the final result that, 
(9)  M  =  P, - mc 
PX 
l 
2 Lerner  (1934) may have been the first to derive the 
relationship  in equation  8. Appendix  B 
We begin with the standard definition  of profits  (II) 
based on price  (P), output  (X), wage  (w), labor  (L), capital 
costs  (i), and capital stock  (K). 
(1)  II  =  PX - WL - iK 
The total differential  of this equation  is, 
(2)  dII  = P(l- l/e,)dX - Ldw - wdL - idK - Kdi 
where  e, is the elasticity  of product demand.  We assume 
that capital costs are constant  so the last term  is zero. 
\ 
In order to simplify this equation we need three more' 
equations.  The first is the total differential  of the 
production  function. 
(3)  dX = a  dL + a  dK 
aL  aK 
The others are the familiar conditions  for cost 
minimization. 
(4)  w = P(l- l/e,)=  and  i = P(l- l/e,)= 
aL  aK 
Substituting  equations  4 into 3 we find, 
(5)  P(l- l/e,)dX = wdL + idK 
And substituting  5 into 2 we have the desired  result, 
(6)  -dn = Ldw 
This means that an incremental  change  in the wage rate 
multiplied  by employment will equal the decline  in profits.1 
Based on the labor demand curve, L can be written  as a 
function of the wage,  L(w), and equation  6 implies that U is 
also a function of the wage, n(w).  At wage wo profits  are 
12 This result applies to the long run case since capital  is 
treated  as a variable.  It is also important to note that 
this is the same result as simply taking the partial 
derivative  of equation  1 with respect to wages but the 
interpretation  is different.  The partial  derivative  holds 
all other variables  constant while the total derivative  in 
(6) allows all variables  to change except  for the price  of 
capital.  The fact that the two are the same is an 
interesting  result  in itself. defined  as II0  and II1  at WI.  We can therefore  integrate 
equation  6 as w increases  from w0 to ~1. 
Wl  w1 
(7) 
/ 
-dn(w) = II0  - l-I1  = Al-I  = 
/ 
L(w)dw 
w0  w0 
The integral on the right side of the equation  is the 
definition  of monopoly  surplus.  Therefore  the change  in 
profits  as wages  rise from w0 to WI is equal to the change 
in monopoly  surplus.  When WI equals the shutdown wage wm, 
nl is zero and the initial profit  (IIO)  is equal to the total 
monopoly  surplus.  This corresponds  to panel b in Figure  3. BIBIOGRAPHY 
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